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GOOD THINGS DON’T COME TO THOSE 
FORCED TO WAIT: DENIAL OF A 
LITIGANT’S REQUEST TO PROCEED 
ANONYMOUSLY CAN BE APPEALED PRIOR 
TO FINAL JUDGMENT IN THE WAKE OF 
DOE v. VILLAGE OF DEERFIELD 
Abstract: On April 12, 2016, in Doe v. Village of Deerfield, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a denial of a motion to proceed 
anonymously is an immediately appealable order under the collateral order doc-
trine. The Seventh Circuit joined the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits in holding that this type of order, examined categorically, satisfies the rigorous 
requirements of the collateral order doctrine. Allowing immediate review of this 
type of order implements a practical construction of the traditional final judgment 
rule that the United States Courts of Appeals can only review orders upon entry of 
a final judgment on the merits of a case from a United States District Court. This 
Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit correctly decided to join the other cir-
cuits’ decisions to allow for the immediate appeal of a denial of a motion to pro-
ceed anonymously. To rule otherwise would result in a party’s loss of a right that 
would be irremediable upon final appellate review. Additionally, the decision is 
likely to have an effect on the proliferation of cases dealing with the First Amend-
ment’s free speech protections and anonymous speech on the Internet. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are arrested for a crime as a result of someone lying to the 
police.1 Despite learning of the lie, the prosecution does not dismiss the case 
and you are tried for something you did not do.2 Even if the court enters a 
judgment on your behalf and expunges your record, you are unlikely to feel 
vindicated.3 In response, you file a lawsuit against the parties who wronged 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that two indi-
viduals knowingly made false statements to a Village of Deerfield police officer in connection to Doe 
violating two criminal ordinances); Page Pate, Malicious Prosecution Against Bank of America Re-
sults in $600,000 Settlement, PATE & JOHNSON: OUR BLOG (Nov. 5 2013), https://www.pagepate.
com/malicious-prosecution-bank-america-results-600000-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/MQ95-AP2H] 
(detailing a $600,000 malicious prosecution judgment received by a bank employee after being acquit-
ted of theft charges brought based on testimony that was not truthful). 
 2 Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 374 (explaining that Doe believed he was arrested and prose-
cuted in retaliation for a previous lawsuit he had filed against another Village of Deerfield police 
officer). 
 3 See id. 
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you.4 For personal reasons, you file the case using a pseudonym but the court, 
considering the importance of judicial transparency, says you must use your 
legal name or the case will be dismissed.5 Do you walk away from the case or 
do you move forward, providing your name?6 When a denial to proceed anon-
ymously has potentially disastrous effects, should a party be forced to await 
entry of a final judgment on the merits to appeal the denial?7 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit faced this question re-
garding the ability to proceed anonymously in 2016 in Doe v. Village of Deer-
field.8 Doe wished to proceed anonymously because he believed being forced 
to use his real name would defeat the purpose of his criminal expungement 
from a prior state criminal case and that having his name associated with a 
criminal case would embarrass him.9 The court ultimately held that Doe could 
not proceed anonymously in the pending action in the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois.10 Simultaneously, however, the court joined 
five other circuits in holding that an appeal arising from a denial to proceed 
anonymously falls within the collateral order doctrine and is thus immediately 
appealable.11 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. (stating that Doe filed a complaint against the Village of Deerfield and the two individu-
als who made false statements against him, asserting an equal protection claim under federal law and a 
malicious prosecution claim under Illinois law). 
 5 Id. at 375, 377 (declining to find Doe’s reasoning for requesting anonymity, potential embar-
rassment and thwarting the purpose of his expunged record, as an exceptional circumstance where 
anonymity should be granted). If an individual is a high-profile criminal defendant, they may seek to 
proceed anonymously to increase their chances of receiving a fair trial by preventing potential jurors 
from being prejudiced by pretrial publicity. Jaime N. Morris, Note, The Anonymous Accused: Protect-
ing Defendants’ Rights in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REV. 901, 903–04 (2003). Despite 
the public’s interest in open and public judicial proceedings, citizens do have personal rights to priva-
cy and the ability to proceed anonymously can be viewed as one such right. See Amit Shertzer, Note, 
Plaintiff Anonymity During Civil Litigation of Childhood Sexual Abuse Cases, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2199, 2206 (2012). Judicial openness and basic standards of fairness support the idea that if a plaintiff 
sues a defendant by name, thereby revealing the defendant to the public, the plaintiff should have to as 
well. Wendy M. Rosenberger, Note, Anonymity in Civil Litigation: The “Doe” Plaintiff, 57 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 580, 583 (1982). A defendant must know who is suing them to benefit from the discovery 
process and to raise defenses. Id. 
 6 See Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 374. 
 7 See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that, if the underlying claim 
were proven, it would amount to a great wrong and that the district court should have granted the 
James’ motion to proceed anonymously). 
 8 See Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 374. 
 9 Id. at 377. 
 10 Id. (explaining the routinely accepted standard that, in order to proceed anonymously, a plain-
tiff must present “exceptional” grounds that justify using a pseudonym in a civil action they voluntari-
ly initiated). 
 11 Id. at 376; Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000); 
M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 802 (10th Cir. 1998); James, 6 F.3d at 234; Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 
320, 322 (11th Cir. 1992); S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 712 (5th Cir. 
1979). 
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This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit correctly decided the juris-
dictional issue.12 Part I of this Comment discusses the importance of the final 
judgment rule and appellate theory as well as anonymity in judicial proceed-
ings.13 Part I also reviews the factual and procedural history of Village of Deer-
field.14 Part II examines two non-final orders that are immediately appealable 
and their similarities to an order denying anonymity.15 Part III argues and con-
cludes that the Seventh Circuit correctly decided that an order denying permis-
sion to proceed anonymously is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine 
and addresses future implications of the decision in the realm of anonymous 
speech on the Internet.16 
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN FINALITY AND ANONYMITY 
The United States Courts of Appeals are generally limited to hearing ap-
peals from final decisions of the district courts.17 A small class of traditionally 
non-final orders, however, is deemed final and thus becomes immediately re-
viewable.18 Section A examines appellate theory and the final judgment rule.19 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 99–116 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 17–55 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 64–98 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 99–116 and accompanying text. 
 17 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (stating that courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction over all ap-
peals from decisions of all district courts of the United States except where the Supreme Court may 
have jurisdiction for direct review). The nine courts of appeals were established by Congress in the 
Judiciary Act of 1891 in order to relieve the enormous caseload imposed on the Supreme Court by the 
increase in federal appeals filings from district courts. History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUDI-
CIAL CTR., www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_of_appeals.html [https://perma.cc/Q68W-
6LWD]. The 1891 Act, known as the Evarts Act, gave the courts of appeals jurisdiction over the ma-
jority of appeals stemming from the district courts and circuit courts. Id. Subsequent acts and statutes 
expanded the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. Id. 
 18 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (announcing there exists 
a class of claims that are independent of and incidental to the underlying merits of an action and are 
too significant to be reviewed only upon final adjudication); Jason Kornmehl, State Action on Appeal: 
Parker Immunity and the Collateral Order Doctrine in Antitrust Litigation, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 
11 (2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the requirements for 
collateral order review must remain strict). By imposing a strict test, only a small and narrow group of 
orders should be reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, thus not undermining the purposes of 
the final judgment rule. See Kornmehl, supra, at 11; Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 
HARV. L REV. 351, 364–66 (1962) (explaining how different courts have interpreted the word collat-
eral in determining whether an appeal is eligible for intermediate review under the doctrine). In taking 
this approach, the court of appeals can weigh a variety of factors that affect the petitioner’s hardship in 
deciding whether to grant review under the doctrine. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra, 
at 366.  
 19 See infra notes 22–44 and accompanying text. 
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Section B discusses the use of anonymity in judicial proceedings.20 Section C 
sets out the facts and procedural history of Village of Deerfield.21 
A. What Does Final Mean?: The Traditional Final Judgment Rule  
and the Collateral Order Doctrine 
The courts of appeals are courts of limited jurisdiction.22 The appellate 
courts are granted the power to review but not the power to intervene.23 The 
role of the court of appeals is to review an alleged error that occurred during 
the trial and not to intervene during the trial and make preliminary judgments, 
in place of the trial court.24 The courts of appeals are limited to reviewing cas-
es where a final judgment has been rendered.25 This limitation preserves the 
sanctity of, and respect afforded to, decisions made by both the trial and appel-
late courts.26  
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 45–55 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
 22 See Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 423, 428 (2013) (explaining that federal courts of appeals only have jurisdiction over final 
decisions by a district court, usually forcing federal litigants to wait to file an appeal until the district 
court has rendered a final judgment); Aaron R. Petty, The Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction, 
62 S.C. L. REV. 353, 354 (2011) (stating that the final judgment rule functions as the dividing line 
between the authority of the trial courts and the authority of appellate courts). 
 23 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (explaining that if a matter has not been conclusively decided and re-
mains open, intervention by appeal is not available); 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911, Westlaw (2d ed.). Review is distinguished from intervention 
based on whether the underlying merits of the case have been resolved. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra, 
§ 3911. If a case remains open and the appeals court is asked to rule on an appeal before entry of a 
final judgment, to rule on the appeal would constitute intrusion as opposed to review. See id. 
 24 See ANNE M. LOFASO, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 3–5 (2010) (ex-
plaining that the role of appellate courts is three-fold, to correct errors, to set precedent, and to do 
justice). 
 25 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). 
 26 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (emphasizing the defer-
ence and respect that appellate courts owe to the decisions made by the district court judge on the 
numerous questions of law and fact that appear prior to a final judgment); Henry v. Lake Charles 
American Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 174 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, 
§ 3911) (explaining that if the trial court is likely to address the challenged motion, there is minimal 
justification for review by the appellate court at this stage); Brief of Civil Procedure Scholars as Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9, Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 797 F.3d 607 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 
12-35946), cert. granted in part, 84 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016) (No. 15-457) [hereinafter 
Brief of Civil Procedure Scholars] (noting the need to maintain the distinctive roles and relationship 
between the district courts and the appellate courts). Trial courts are well suited to review the facts of 
a case where they can see witnesses and jurors whereas appellate courts are well suited for slow and 
methodical review of legal issues. See Samuel J. Roberts, The Trial Court: Keystone of Justice, 53 PA. 
B. ASS’N Q. 165, 168 (1982) (explaining that trial courts can contribute to the quality and efficiency 
of the judicial system by ensuring that trial records are thorough, thereby reducing the need for frivo-
lous appeals). This furthers two main functions of the appellate courts, to correct errors committed 
during trial and to further goals of the judicial system. Joseph R. Weisberger, Appellate Courts: The 
Challenge of Inundation, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 237, 239 (1982). 
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Appellate courts have the authority to review interlocutory appeals.27 An 
interlocutory appeal stems from a ruling entered by the trial court prior to entry 
of a final judgment.28 The most palpable reason to limit the jurisdiction of 
courts of appeals to review of final judgments is to promote judicial economy 
and minimize trivial and unnecessary delays in litigation.29 For example, al-
lowing an interlocutory appeal interferes with the trial judge’s responsibilities 
to supervise judicial proceedings and ensure that trials proceed as expediently 
and efficiently as possible.30 This type of review also frustrates the role of ap-
pellate judges, as it requires them to rule based on a deficient record.31 Inter-
locutory review absent a more developed record tends to decrease the reliabil-
ity of the court’s pronouncement on the issue.32 Restrictions on the cases or 
motions that courts of appeals can hear improve the quality of decisions that 
the judges are able to render by eliminating redundant review of substantive 
questions that serves only to consume the time of the appellate court.33 Finally, 
the restriction allows the trial process to proceed unimpeded, as it may be pos-
                                                                                                                           
 27 28 U.S.C. § 1292. 
 28 See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995) (acknowledging that allowing appeals at this 
stage can create problems as to the basic functions of both the trial judge and the appellate judge, 
burden the litigation, and result in subpar review of the issue at hand); ERIC J. MAGNUSON & DAVID 
F. HERR, FEDERAL APPEALS—JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE § 2.5 (2016) (explaining that the final 
judgment rule preserves judicial economy and reduces delay in litigation proceedings); Tory Weigand, 
Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b): A First Circuit Survey and Review, 
19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 183, 183–84 (2014) (explaining that an interlocutory appeal arises 
when the trial court has decided an issue but not rendered a final judgment in the case and the litigant 
seeks review of that decision). The interlocutory appeal is an exception to the final judgment rule and 
seeks to resolve instances where failure to immediately grant the appeal would cause the particular 
litigant enormous injustice. Weigand, supra, at 183–84. 
 29 Johnson, 515 U.S. at 309 (stating various forms of delay caused by traditionally premature 
appeals); Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four 
Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 542 (1998) (noting the final judgment rule works in the 
public’s interest in having a legal system that resolves cases efficiently and without undue costs to the 
people). 
 30 See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 309 (stating that a judge’s main function is to supervise trials and that 
an interlocutory appeal interferes with this basic function, and noting that interlocutory appeals hinder 
progression through the trial and add to litigations costs); Anderson, supra note 29, at 542 (explaining 
that allowing immediate appeal of non-final orders would require appellate judges to review innumer-
ous amounts of pretrial motions, which in turn would further add on to their already burdened docket). 
 31 See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 309 (stating that judges cannot exercise best judgment about the issue 
when presented with an incomplete record of the case). The role of appellate courts is to decide ques-
tions of law, which necessitates a finding of the facts first. THOMAS E. BAKER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A 
PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 35–36 (2009). It is the trial court’s, 
and not the appellate court’s, role to determine the facts and apply principles of law. Id. These deter-
minations can then be reviewed by the expertise of appellate courts. See id. Without knowing all the 
facts of a case, an appellate court cannot properly decide whether the principles of law have been 
correctly applied. See id. 
 32 Partrederiet Treasure Saga v. Joy Mfg. Co., 804 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1986); 15A WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 23, § 3911. 
 33 Partrederiet Treasure Saga, 804 F.2d at 310; 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3911. 
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sible for the case to be resolved prior to a ruling on the pending collateral ap-
peal.34 
Nevertheless, a small class of non-final orders has been designated as re-
viewable by the courts of appeals under the collateral order doctrine.35 This 
class of non-final orders is carved out because the rights at issue have been 
deemed intrinsically significant to the disposition of the case and therefore 
immediately appealable.36 Denying an immediate appeal of an order that falls 
in this class would result in the moving party irreparably losing their asserted 
right(s).37 For example, if immediate appealability was unavailable in a situa-
tion where an individual had immunity to stand trial, his or her right to avoid 
trial would be immediately forfeited and no sufficient remedy exists that could 
be given upon appeal of a final judgment on the merits of the case.38 
In order to show that an order is reviewable under the collateral order 
doctrine, the party seeking review must demonstrate that the district court or-
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 310 (recognizing that delayed review of appeals until final judgment 
allows the case to proceed in a timely manner and that the underlying action might be decidable prior 
to a ruling on the pending appeal); 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 3911 (explaining that the 
limited jurisdiction helps avoid unnecessary and duplicative examination of the same issues by the 
court of appeals). 
 35 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2012) (listing exceptions to customary jurisdiction of appellate 
courts). This statutory provision describes several instances where an exception to the final judgment 
rule, embodied in § 1291, can be made. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (noting that the appeal at issue is 
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine because the claim of right asserted in the appeal is truly 
independent from the claim of right asserted in the underlying action); Robert J. Martineau, Defining 
Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L REV. 717, 
729 (1993). The doctrine emerged in this case when the court held that orders which “finally deter-
mine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be 
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be de-
ferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. See generally Carleton M. Crick, 
The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932) (discussing the evolution of the 
appeals process in England and the United States and the rationales supporting the final judgment 
rule); Gerald T. Wetherington, Appellate Review of Final and Non-Final Orders in Florida Civil Cas-
es—An Overview, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 63–64 (1984) (covering policies that support the 
final judgment rule). 
 36 See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546 (explaining that the rights asserted are too important to be denied 
appellate review until final judgment on the merits has been entered). To date, the only kind of order 
the Court has granted collateral order review to is an order that involves a right that would be perma-
nently forfeited without immediate review. Martineau, supra note 35, at 742. 
 37 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 105 (2017); see Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970) 
(explaining that if a party were denied immediate appeal of a double jeopardy claim, his Fifth 
Amendment rights would be violated by forcing him to stand trial again and bear the personal burden 
and public shame that would follow). 
 38 See James D. Gordon III, Double Jeopardy and Appeal of Dismissals: A Before-and-After 
Approach, 69 CAL. L. REV. 863, 865–67 (1981) (explaining that not only does the double jeopardy 
clause protect the defendant from undergoing the tribulations of a trial for a second time, but also 
protects him from the increased likelihood of being found guilty in a second trial and his interest in 
jury nullification, all which cannot be repaired upon delayed appellate review). The loss of the right to 
avoid trial cannot be vindicated after a person has stood trial. See id. 
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der is (1) conclusive on the issue, (2) resolves an important question that is 
severable from the merits of the case, and (3) renders the question “effectively 
unreviewable” on an appeal from a final judgment in the underlying action.39 
The requirements are intentionally “stringent,” reinforcing the bias against a 
piecemeal approach to litigation.40 When considering whether a given order is 
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, the courts of appeals do not 
scrutinize the individual denial but rather examine the category to which the 
claim belongs as a whole.41 
The collateral order doctrine is not considered an exception to the final 
judgment rule, but rather a practical construction of the rule.42 By construing 
the doctrine as a practical construction of the final judgment rule, a collateral 
order is itself a final order on a specific issue in a case that is severable from 
the underlying merits of the action.43 It can thus be ruled on prior to the final 
judgment in a case and remain faithful to the purposes of the final judgment 
rule.44 
B. Use of Anonymity in the Judicial System 
The ability of a party to proceed anonymously in judicial proceedings is 
strongly disfavored because of the shield and veil it creates between the court 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); United States v. MacDonald, 435 
U.S. 850, 855 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977). The Supreme Court first 
articulated this test in 1949 in Cohen v. Beneficial Industries Loan Corp., drawing on previous reason-
ing from prior decisions. 337 U.S. at 546–47. 
 40 See Dig. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 872 (1994) (recognizing the im-
portance of judicial efficiency while also acknowledging the importance of rights that may be “irre-
trievably lost” if some orders are not immediately appealable); Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South 
Bend, Inc., 772 F.3d 1085, 1088–89 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the requirements to trigger collat-
eral order doctrine review must be strict in order not to override the “finality interests” served by 
§ 1291). 
 41 Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009) (explaining that if a particular 
class of claims can be appropriately addressed after adjudication of the case, a denial of review prior 
to final judgment does no irreparable injustice); Dig. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 868. 
 42 Dig. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 867; see Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546–47 (explaining that the Su-
preme Court has long given the provisions in § 1291 a practical construction); United States v. River 
Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 414 (1926) (acknowledging that the rule has been functional-
ly interpreted to allow immediate review of a final decision on an issue that is distinct from the main 
issue). See generally William M. Lukens, Comment, The Collateral Order Doctrine in California, 15 
HASTINGS L.J. 105, 105–06 (1964) (explaining that if final order meant last order there could be only 
one final order in a case and thus only one appeal). As a result, the word final has been used to refer to 
resolution of parties’ rights on a specific issue. Lukens, supra, at 105–06. Therefore, there may be 
multiple final judgments in an action because there are likely to be several contested issues that re-
quire a judgment. Id. 
 43 See Dig. Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 867 (announcing that a practical construction of the statute 
allows the term “final order” to encompass orders that do not necessarily end the litigation by entry of 
a final judgment on the merits). Under this construction, a small class of traditionally non-final orders 
must be considered final in the interests of upholding a functioning judicial system. See id. 
 44 Id. at 867–68. 
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and the public.45 A strong common law tradition in favor of transparent judicial 
proceedings dates back to 15th century England.46 Today, U.S. courts routinely 
accept this tradition of openness to the public.47 The Supreme Court has, how-
ever, acknowledged that there are instances in which certain interests outweigh 
the preference for judicial openness, but has noted that these instances are ra-
re.48 Anonymity of parties, which creates a blemish on judicial transparency, is 
thus vigorously discouraged.49 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
not only disfavor anonymity, they do not allow it.50 
There are, however, certain types of cases where a party electing to pro-
ceed anonymously is the norm.51 Anonymity is almost always granted in cases 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 376–77 (stating that the public has a right to know the 
names of litigants who take up time, space, and money in the court system that the public is paying 
for); Zavaras, 139 F.3d at 800 (stating that the court systems are inherently public because they exist 
to serve the needs of the public and that even a cursory review of judicial history forces one to accept 
that a secretive judicial system is not in harmony with the existence of a free society); Tom Isler, 
White Paper: Anonymous Civil Litigants, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS, http://www.rcfp.
org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-fall-2015/white-paper-
anonymous-civil-l [https://perma.cc/V3UM-6386]. Party anonymity in the court system is a form of 
court closure by cutting off the public’s access to possibly valuable information concerning the pend-
ing litigation. Isler, supra. The benefits of a transparent judicial system are undercut when the public 
is restricted from knowing who is making use of the court system. Id. When party anonymity is al-
lowed, other secrecy tools are often concomitantly employed, further reducing litigation transparency. 
Id. 
 46 David C. Scileppi, Note, Anonymous Corporate Defamation Plaintiffs: Trampling the First 
Amendment or Protecting the Rights of Litigants?, 54 FLA. L. REV. 333, 337–38 (2002). 
 47 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978) (acknowledging the pub-
lic’s right to review and copy public documents). The courts in the United States acknowledge that the 
public has the right to view public documents, which includes judicial records. See id. An individual 
does not need to have a personal stake in the matter of which they wish to view documents; it is 
enough for an individual to want to “keep a watchful eye” on the operation of public agencies and the 
government. See id.; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (stating that, because trials are open 
proceedings, the events that take place in a court room are “public property”); Luckett v. Beaudet, 21 
F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1029 (D. Minn. 1998) (explaining that identification of parties in a case is integral 
in supporting the First Amendment interest in public proceedings); A.B.C. v. X.Y.Z. Corp., 660 A.2d 
1199, 1201 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (pointing out that requiring identity of parties decreases 
the likelihood of another party mistakenly being associated with the case). 
 48 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982) 
(stating that the circumstances under which proceedings in a criminal trial should not be shared with 
the public are limited). 
 49 See Frank, 951 F.2d at 324 (holding that lawsuits are public events and that a party should only 
be allowed to proceed anonymously in exceptional cases involving highly sensitive and personal is-
sues). 
 50 FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (requiring that all parties to a civil action be named in the complaint). 
 51 See Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004) (adding that a party’s fear of 
retaliation as a response for instituting a litigation can be a compelling reason for the court to allow 
the party to proceed anonymously); Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869, 
872 (7th Cir. 1997) (giving examples of types of cases, such as those that require privacy protections, 
rape victims and other vulnerable parties, that warrant a party to a litigation to proceed anonymously). 
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that involve sexual assault in order to protect the privacy of the victim.52 It is 
also commonly allowed in cases involving minors.53 Outside of these, and a few 
other, specifically defined situations, in deciding if a party should proceed anon-
ymously, the court must balance the relevant competing interests.54 This balanc-
ing test takes into consideration the party’s reasons for desiring anonymity ver-
sus the prejudice anonymity causes to the opposing party and the public.55 
C. Northern District of Illinois Denies Motion to Proceed Anonymously 
Due to Lack of Meritorious Circumstances 
In August 2012, John Doe was arrested and prosecuted for violating two 
criminal ordinances in Deerfield, Illinois.56 Doe was arrested based on state-
ments of two witnesses.57 Ultimately, Doe was found not guilty in this criminal 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See, e.g., Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (allowing anonymity in a case 
involving false claims of child sexual abuse to curb plaintiff’s future psychological harm); Doe v. 
Howe, 607 S.E.2d 354, 357 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing plaintiff who was sexually abused by a 
school employee to use a pseudonym); Radhika Sanghani, Every Rape Accuser Deserves Anonymity—
It’s the Least We Can Do, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/
life/every-rape-accuser-deserves-anonymity---its-the-least-we-can-do/ [https://perma.cc/S5SB-SYTU] 
(explaining that allowing plaintiffs in a rape case to proceed anonymously is a minute concession 
when considering the plaintiff is brave enough to press charges and live through the incredibly inva-
sive process that constitutes a rape trial). 
 53 Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (vacating and remanding district 
court’s decision denying plaintiffs’, who engaged in sexually explicit conduct as minors in Girls Gone 
Wild videos, motion to proceed anonymously); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(allowing anonymity for plaintiffs who challenged constitutionality of prayer and bible readings in a 
public school because of real threatened violence and retaliation against their children); see Lisa M. 
Jones et al., Protecting Victims’ Identities in Press Coverage of Child Victimization, 11 JOURNALISM 
347, 349 (2010) (explaining that the United States’ enhanced privacy provisions for minors in the 
judicial system stems from the idea that stigma is especially detrimental to a child’s development and 
that it impedes the child’s ability to move on and grow from bad circumstances in their past). 
 54 See Zavaras, 139 F.3d at 801 (explaining that use of anonymity in court proceedings is limited 
to instances where privacy interests are extremely high or there is a threat of physical harm if identity 
is revealed and that potential economic or professional harm, alone, do not fall under those catego-
ries); Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186 (announcing that there is no “hard and fast formula” in deciding when a 
party may proceed anonymously but the decision calls for a balancing of the parties’ interests); Isler, 
supra note 45 (explaining that three to four factors are routinely used to balance the interests of the 
parties but that some courts have looked beyond these, including the Third Circuit, which has identi-
fied nine factors). 
 55 See Blue Cross, 112 F.3d at 872 (stating that because the case involves a medical issue is not 
enough of an exceptional circumstance warranting anonymity that outweighs the public’s interest and 
right to know who is using their courts). But see James, 6 F.3d at 237 (reversing the district court’s 
denial of plaintiffs’ motion to proceed anonymously in a case involving a medical issue). 
 56 Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 374 (explaining that John Doe claimed this initial arrest and 
prosecution were done for retaliatory reasons stemming from a previous lawsuit that he had filed 
against a police officer from the Village of Deerfield). 
 57 Id. During trial, the prosecution learned that the statements underlying Doe’s arrest were false 
but continued with prosecuting Doe. Id. The facts reviewed from the complaint are taken as true. Id.  
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case.58 On September 23, 2014, Doe, using a pseudonym, filed a complaint in 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the Village 
of Deerfield and the two witnesses who provided false statements.59 In January 
and February 2015, the three defendants filed individual motions to dismiss the 
case for Doe’s failure to comply with procedural requirements regarding iden-
tification of the parties to an action.60 
On May 5, 2015, the court denied Doe’s motion to proceed anonymously 
and granted defendants’ motions to dismiss without prejudice.61 On June 1, 
2015, Doe filed a motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the re-
sult of his appeal for interlocutory review to the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.62 The district court granted the stay and a panel of the Seventh Circuit 
reviewed the appeal.63 
II. COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE: WHAT ORDERS MEET THE STRICT 
REQUIREMENTS FOR IMMEDIATE APPELLATE REVIEW? 
The United States Supreme Court and various United States Courts of 
Appeals have granted collaterally appealable status to a variety of orders in 
both criminal and civil contexts.64 Examples include orders rejecting a public 
official’s claim of absolute or qualified immunity, orders rejecting a state’s 
claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and orders denying a criminal de-
fendant’s claim of double jeopardy.65 Section A analyzes denial of class certifi-
                                                                                                                           
 58 See Brief for Defendant at 2, Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 
15-2069), 2015 WL 7689569, at *2 [hereinafter Brief for Defendant] (stating that the ordinance viola-
tions, which were the basis for the arrest and subsequent prosecution, were resolved in Doe’s favor 
and that an order was entered to expunge Doe’s record of both the arrest and prosecution). 
 59 Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 374. The complaint asserted two separate grounds for filing 
the suit. Id. The first was a federal claim under the equal protections clause of the U.S. Constitution 
under § 1983. Id. The second was a malicious prosecution claim under Illinois state law. Id. 
 60 Id. Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stipulates that the complaint must con-
tain the names of all parties in an action. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a). 
 61 Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 377. The district court reasoned that potential embarrassment 
or further retaliation for the suit were not sufficiently compelling reasons to allow anonymity in a suit 
that was commenced on Doe’s own initiative. Id. The court simultaneously granted Doe leave to file 
an amended complaint by May 15, 2015, identifying himself by name. Brief for Defendant, supra note 
58, at 3. 
 62 Brief for Defendant, supra note 58, at 1. 
 63 Id. 
 64 See Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 772 F.3d 1085, 1089 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(listing different examples of classes of claims that have been deemed reviewable under the collateral 
order doctrine). 
 65 Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144–45 (1993) 
(stating that a state or its agent’s motion to dismiss on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
implicates a constitutional protection and therefore is immediately appealable); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) (stating that a denial of absolute immunity is an order that falls within the 
collateral order doctrine because the very purpose of the immunity is that the immune individual does 
not have to answer for his conduct in an action for civil damages); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 
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cation and double jeopardy orders.66 Section B compares the orders discussed 
in Section A with motions to proceed anonymously.67 Section C discusses the 
Seventh Circuit’s application of the collateral order to the facts of Doe v. Vil-
lage of Deerfield.68 
A. Application of Collateral Order Doctrine to Denial of Class  
Certification and Denial of a Motion to Dismiss  
Under Double Jeopardy 
Denial of class certification is an example of a non-final order that has 
been carved out as an exception to the final judgment rule.69 Class certification 
is a determination that must be made in the preliminary stages of a lawsuit in 
order to assess whether it is appropriate for the suit to proceed as a class ac-
tion.70 The decision to deny or grant class certification is by definition inter-
locutory.71 Some district court judges, however, have opined that a denial of a 
class certification should be considered final under § 1291.72 
Initially, some courts adhered to the “death knell doctrine,” which held 
that denial of class certification, if not immediately appealable, would likely 
                                                                                                                           
743 (1982) (explaining that an appeal that arises out of claims alleging a threatened breach of presi-
dential powers are immediately appealable); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660–61 (1977) 
(explaining the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause includes a guarantee not to be put to 
trial twice for the same offense, therefore interlocutory review of a denial of a double jeopardy claim 
must be granted to avoid irreparable harm to the defendant). 
 66 See infra notes 69–81 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 82–91 and accompanying text. 
68 See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 69 See Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certifica-
tion and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1531, 1534–36 (2000) (explaining that because denial or grant of class certification has 
important ramifications for both plaintiff and defendant, interlocutory appeals of these orders are 
common by the party adversely affected by them). Because class certification is not a final order, it 
was difficult for parties to get interlocutory review of these decisions and it was recognized that some 
mechanism had to be implemented to ease the constraints imposed on parties by the final judgment 
rule. See id. 
 70 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1); see Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV.1897, 1916 (2014) (explaining that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires the court to make an early assessment on the workability of a class action trial). 
 71 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470 (1978) (explaining that class certifica-
tion is inherently interlocutory because the certification will determine whether the case moves for-
ward and this decision is not based on the underlying merits of the case). 
 72 28 U.S.C § 1291 (2012); see FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment. 
The note postured that judges were aware and sensitive to the fact that if a denial of class certification 
were not immediately appealable, the litigation may be prematurely terminated. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 
advisory committee’s note to 1996 amendment. Whether the litigation proceeded would be directly 
correlated to the denial and therefore judges believed that denial of class certification should be con-
sidered final for appeal under § 1291. See id. 
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preclude many plaintiffs from prosecuting their claims.73 This doctrine, how-
ever, did not remain in force for long because it conflicted with the final judg-
ment rule’s core purposes of promoting judicial efficiency and maintaining the 
respective roles of the district and appellate courts.74 Following rejection of the 
death knell doctrine, concerns about the adequacy of the remedies available for 
a denial of class certification resurfaced.75 Congress was not content with the 
available remedies for a denial of class certification.76 As a result, Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to allow a denial of class 
certification to be immediately appealable despite not being a final order.77 
Interlocutory appeals are less likely to be accepted in criminal than in civ-
il cases because a criminal interlocutory appeal is more likely to require review 
of some portion of the merits of the underlying action.78 A class of criminal 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Livesay, 437 U.S at 469 (explaining that if an appeal denying class certification was denied 
review until the entry of final judgment two things were likely to happen: (1) if each person in the 
class had a small individual stake in the litigation, the case would likely end with denial of class certi-
fication; and (2) if the parties who made up the class did not pursue the litigation individually upon 
denial of class certification, neither the underlying claim nor the decision to deny class certification 
would ever receive appellate review); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(acknowledging that if the denial of class certification were not immediately appealable then the un-
derlying claims would not likely be adjudicated given that most lawyers would not pursue an individ-
ual claim worth $70); Brief of Civil Procedure Scholars, supra note 26, at 8 (stating that a decreased 
likelihood of group recovery is likely to diminish any incentive to continue the litigation). Moreover, 
the Court noted that delayed review would not allow the court to decide if the class action were ac-
ceptable under the newly reformulated Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Livesay, 437 
U.S at 469. 
 74 See Livesay, 437 U.S at 476–77 (outlining how the death knell doctrine disrupted a cornerstone 
of the final judgment rule by upsetting the relationship between district courts and appellate courts by 
allowing piecemeal litigation and drawing out the trial process); Brief of Civil Procedure Scholars, 
supra note 26, at 10 (demonstrating how the death knell doctrine would create a never ending cycle of 
appeals that the appellate courts would have to review, further going against the policies underlying 
the final judgment rule); see also supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text (outlining the reasons 
supporting restricted appellate jurisdiction). 
 75 See Brief of Civil Procedure Scholars, supra note 26, at 11 (describing the only hopes those 
who wished for immediate review of a denial of class certification had after Livesay’s rejection of the 
death knell doctrine). The first is a discretionary appeal under § 1292(b), which requires approval 
from both the district court and the appellate court for immediate review. Id. The second, and more 
extreme, option was to file a writ of mandamus, which would allow the appellate court to review the 
denial on normal jurisdictional grounds. Id. 
 76 Id. Congress created two new rulemaking powers to address these concerns. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(c) (2012) (granting the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules for the district courts defin-
ing when an order was final for purposes of appeal under § 1291); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (stating that 
the Supreme Court can create rules that allow for an immediate appeal of an interlocutory decision 
that is not otherwise covered by this section); Brief of Civil Procedure Scholars, supra note 26, at 11. 
 77 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (stating that a court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an 
order denying class certification so long as it is filed within fourteen days of the district court’s order 
being entered). 
 78 See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 321 (1984) (explaining the government’s posi-
tion that an evaluation of a double jeopardy claim almost inevitably requires the court to review the 
evidence that was presented at the first trial). In order to dispose of a double jeopardy claim, the court 
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orders, nevertheless, has been deemed reviewable under the collateral order 
doctrine.79 One common immediately appealable non-final order is denial of a 
defendant’s pre-trial motion to dismiss an indictment under double jeopardy.80 
A delayed review of a motion to dismiss under double jeopardy would irrepa-
rably imperil the defendant’s right to not stand trial twice for the crime because 
there is no way to remedy standing trial for a trial you ought not to have stood 
except through money damages and, therefore, the court has determined that 
immediate review is necessary.81 
B. Denial to Proceed Anonymously Raises the Same Issues if  
Interlocutory Review Is Not Granted 
The adverse consequences of denying an immediate appeal of a denial of 
a motion to proceed anonymously are similar to those resulting from the denial 
of class certification and the denial requesting dismissal of an indictment under 
double jeopardy.82 In the cases of both class certification and anonymity, the 
incentive to continue litigation may be removed.83 Denial of class certification 
                                                                                                                           
would have to review the evidence introduced at trial and come to a conclusion that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict the petitioner as a matter of law on those facts. Id. This review is indistinguish-
able from the review an appellate court would have to do for an appeal that was filed after a judgment 
on the merits was entered. Id.; Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962) (stating that the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a speedy trial for criminal cases and that Rule 2 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure advises that the rules should be construed so as to produce a trial that is 
simple in procedure and avoids undue expense and delay). But see 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
23, § 3911 (acknowledging that some rights are so significant that review under the collateral order 
doctrine is acceptable even if the review requires a fair amount of discussion regarding the underlying 
merits). 
 79 See, e.g., Richardson, 468 U.S. at 320 (announcing that certiorari was granted because of the 
implications on the efficient administration of criminal proceedings); Cobbledick v. United States, 
309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940) (stating that a motion to quash a subpoena requiring a witness to appear 
before a grand jury is inherently intertwined with assuring efficient administration of federal criminal 
law). 
 80 See Abney, 431 U.S. at 662 (explaining that the guaranteed protections under the Fifth 
Amendment would be irreparably forfeited if a party seeking pre-trial dismissal on double jeopardy 
grounds were forced to stand trial for the same crime a second time). 
 81 See id. In order for a criminal defendant to receive the full protection guarantees of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, his or her challenge to the indictment, under the clause, must be effectively reviewed 
prior to any exposure of a possible new trial. See id. 
 82 See id. at 661 (stating that the protective rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause would be 
rendered moot if appellate review of such claims was barred prior to entry of final judgment); Doe v. 
Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding that requiring parties to use their 
real names in a case and leaving review of a denial to proceed anonymously until the case is fully 
litigated renders the final review useless and provides no remedy). 
 83 Compare James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 1993) (explaining that plaintiffs were so 
concerned with protecting their identity as well as those of their children that they wrote to the court in 
support of their motion that if anonymity were not granted, they would voluntarily dismiss the action), 
with Brief of Civil Procedure Scholars, supra note 26, at 8 (explaining that if denial of class certifica-
tion renders an individual plaintiff’s claim too small the case is unlikely to continue). 
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may end the litigation because it may not be financially feasible or wise for the 
plaintiffs to pursue their claims on an individual basis.84 Denial of a motion to 
proceed anonymously may end the litigation because the potential shame, em-
barrassment or fear of retaliation may be so overwhelming that the party aban-
dons their claim.85 In both of these cases, allowing only a delayed review may 
deny those with justifiable claims their day in court.86 
An incurable harm results from precluding an immediate appeal of a de-
nial of a motion to dismiss for double jeopardy and a denial of a motion to 
proceed anonymously.87 A defendant forced to stand trial twice for the same 
crime cannot be given an adequate remedy upon final appellate review.88 No 
adequate remedy exists for the loss of time and privacy, emotional distress and 
public humiliation experienced from having to stand trial when the defendant 
should not have had to do so.89 Similarly, a party forced to proceed using their 
given name cannot be given satisfactory redress upon final appellate review 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Livesay, 437 U.S. at 469–70; Brief of Civil Procedure Scholars, supra note 26, at 8. 
 85 See Meg Garvin et al., Protecting Victims’ Privacy Rights: The Use of Pseudonyms in Civil 
Lawsuits, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN BULL., July 2011, at 1 (noting that requiring plaintiffs to file a 
lawsuit using their real name in turn allows the general public to access the most intimate details not 
only of the case but of the plaintiffs’ personal lives through a simple Google search). Refusing to 
allow plaintiffs, particularly those who are victims of sexual crimes, to proceed anonymously is a 
form of re-victimization. Andrea A. Curcio, Rule 412 Laid Bare: A Procedural Rule That Cannot 
Adequately Protect Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs from Embarrassing Exposure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 
125, 155–56 (1998) (explaining that childhood sexual abuse is one of the most personal and private 
issues and forcing a plaintiff to have this abusive past exposed has the potential to be irreparably dam-
aging); Garvin et al., supra, at 1. 
 86 See Eisen, 370 F.2d at 120 (explaining that if the appeal is dismissed, the merits of the case will 
never be reviewed). 
 87 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957) (explaining that forcing an individual 
to stand trial anew for the same crime contributes to feelings of anxiety, embarrassment, living in a 
state of uncertainty, and also enhances the likelihood of the defendant being found guilty, regardless 
of whether that is actually the truth); see also S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 
707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that party anonymity is more likely to be granted in cases where 
people have to divulge very personal and intimate information or admit that they have broken a law or 
wished to engage in prohibited conduct). It is also more likely to be granted when the party may be 
vulnerable to retaliation from current and future employers, economic harm or damage to their reputa-
tion. See S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n, 599 F.2d at 713; Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106, 107 
(N.D. Ohio 1973) (granting plaintiffs’ motion to proceed using pseudonyms to protect them from 
potential reprisals by their employers in response to filing the underlying action). 
 88 See Richardson, 468 U.S. at 328 (concluding that declaration of a mistrial ends one judicial 
proceeding and forcing someone to stand trial again on the same indictment would unquestionably 
subject the defendant to the harms that the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect him from). 
 89 See id. (describing the supporting policy rationales of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which aim 
to protect defendants from unnecessary embarrassment, additional expenses, and living in a constant 
state of anxiety); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 859 (1978) (stating that an acquittal in a 
retrial stemming from a denial of motion to dismiss under Double Jeopardy grounds would not negate 
the defendant’s extreme hardship in standing trial twice); Abney, 431 U.S. at 661–62 (explaining that 
the Fifth Amendments provides for protection against embarrassment, expense, and being compelled 
to live in anxiety and fear and that the protection would be wholly worthless if the defendant were 
forced to stand trial a second time before his appeal could be heard). 
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because once a name, and its associated litigation, is made available to the 
public, it cannot be taken back.90 Finally, beyond raising similar outcome is-
sues if an immediate appeal is not available, all three motions give rise to an 
appeal where a decision on the issue will conclusively determine the issue and 
the issue is clearly collateral to the merits of the case.91 
C. Seventh Circuit Allows Collateral Review of Denial of Anonymity 
The question of immediate appealability of a denial of a motion to proceed 
anonymously was a matter of first impression for the circuit.92 The court joined 
five other circuits in finding that a motion to proceed anonymously is immedi-
ately appealable under the collateral doctrine.93 First, it reasoned that ruling on 
the motion conclusively resolves the issue presented.94 Second, the issue of party 
anonymity is completely separate from the underlying merits of the case.95 
Third, persuaded by a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, only allowing review of the appeal after final judgment would serve no 
purpose to the petitioner.96 On application of their holding, the court found that 
Doe was not entitled to anonymity in this case, and affirmed the district court.97 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that requiring the plaintiffs to amend their complaint and litigate their claims using their real names 
will render the issue of anonymity moot upon final appellate review); James, 6 F.3d at 237 (noting 
that both parties agree that the consequences of the anonymity order cannot be effectively redressed 
on final appellate review); Jane Roes 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC., 77 F. Supp. 3d 990, 995 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (explaining that because exotic dancers are in a unique circumstance, with respect to conse-
quences from disclosure of their real names, only allowing review of a denial to proceed under a 
pseudonym at final appellate review subjects the women to a higher likelihood of uncorrectable 
harm). 
 91 Abney, 431 U.S. at 659–60; Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 376; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) 
advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment (acknowledging the court of appeals’ discretion in 
deciding to grant or deny an appeal stemming from a denial of class certification and that they can 
consider any issues they find persuasive). 
 92 Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 375; Lukens, supra note 42, at 105–06 (explaining that if final 
order meant last order there could be only one final order in a case and thus only one appeal would be 
allowed). 
 93 Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 376. 
 94 Id.; see also Lukens, supra note 42, at 105–06 (arguing that multiple issues in a single case 
may be decided conclusively at different moments, and finality should be measured according to the 
particular issue). 
 95 Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 376. The decision to allow a party to proceed through trial 
using a fictitious name will have no material effect on the litigation process and final judgment. See 
id. 
 96 Id. If a party was required to use their given name throughout a trial and only allowed to appeal 
after a final judgment had been entered, the appeal would be moot because his or her name would 
already be a part of the public record. See id. 
 97 Id. 
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The case is currently pending on the merits of plaintiff’s claims in the Northern 
District of Illinois.98 
III. VILLAGE OF DEERFIELD AND SIMILAR CASES SET THE STAGE FOR 
FUTURE LAWSUITS INVOLVING FIRST AMENDMENT AND  
PRIVACY CONCERNS ON THE INTERNET 
In 2016, in Doe v. Village of Deerfield, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit correctly decided that a denial of a motion to proceed anony-
mously could be immediately reviewed prior to final judgment from the district 
court.99 The court also correctly decided that Doe’s situation was not one that 
warranted party anonymity.100 The case clearly did not fall into the category of 
cases where anonymity is virtually expected and accepted.101 Additionally, Doe’s 
stated interests were not sufficiently compelling when weighed against the pub-
lic’s and parties’ rights to know the identities of parties to an action.102 The abil-
ity to proceed anonymously must continue to be reserved for cases where the 
party’s personal interest for anonymity is very high.103 
The ability to proceed anonymously and appeal a denial to proceed anon-
ymously will become increasingly important as social media and online fo-
                                                                                                                           
 98 Second Amended Complaint at 1, Neiman v. Village of Deerfield, No. 14-cv-07423 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 2, 2016). John Doe filed a notice regarding his motion to join defendants on July 27, 2016, this 
time giving his real name, Kenneth Neiman. Motion to Join Defendants at 1, Neiman v. Village of 
Deerfield, No. 14-cv-07423 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2016). 
 99 Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 100 See id. at 377 (relying on the district court’s comprehensive and judicious analysis of the ano-
nymity issue). 
 101 See Rosenberger, supra note 5, at 584 (dividing cases into two groups where circumstances 
implicate the necessity of anonymity: (1) where concealing identity of the plaintiff decreases the like-
lihood of a threatened harm coming to fruition; and (2) where concealing identity serves to protect the 
plaintiff’s private life from public scrutiny in cases containing extremely intimate facts). 
 102 Compare Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 377 (stating that embarrassment and connection to 
a criminal record that had been expunged are not exceptional circumstances worthy of anonymity), 
with Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) (noting that traditionally 
civil and criminal trials have been accepted as open proceedings), and Rosenberger, supra note 5, at 
583 (noting that the plaintiff’s identity is crucial to allowing the defendant to fully utilize the discov-
ery process and allow the defendant to determine effective defenses). 
 103 See Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 409 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that the Third Circuit has regu-
larly referred to a list of factors enunciated in Doe v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co. in 
determining whether anonymity should be granted). Some of these additional factors include: deci-
phering whether the party seeking anonymity has improper ulterior motives behind the request, decid-
ing that, based on the nature of the case, the public has a fairly weak interest in knowing the identities 
of the parties and whether the status of the party as a public figure would increase the public’s interest 
in knowing the names of the litigants. Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 
467–68 (E.D. Pa. 1997). This is not an exhaustive list and courts should look to the specific circum-
stances of a case to determine if other factors should be considered. See id. at 468; Rosenberger, supra 
note 5, at 595 (explaining that “justiciability, discovery, the enforceability of relief, and the public 
interest in knowing the plaintiff’s identity” are factors the court should take into account in determin-
ing the consequences of granting or denying anonymity). 
2017] Denials of Anonymity Properly Entitled to Collateral Review 221 
rums continue to expand.104 The U.S. Supreme Court has established that the 
First Amendment protects individuals who wish to anonymously distribute 
leaflets and campaign literature.105 In this day and age, similar literature and 
leaflets are often disseminated online through websites, blogs, and online fo-
rums, where the potential audience is potentially at its greatest.106 With this 
technological evolution, it would be natural for the First Amendment’s protec-
tion to be extended to those individuals posting similar anonymous content on 
the Internet.107 
With the advent of Internet anonymity, people are more comfortable in 
widely disseminating provocative opinions or negative views about people or 
institutions knowing they are unlikely to be held accountable.108 The screen 
provides a shield of anonymity.109 It would be a natural progression to extend 
the Court’s First Amendment free speech protections to anonymous speech on 
the Internet as the Internet is the modern day version of someone handing out 
leaflets on the street.110 As a result, when an individual posts anonymous 
                                                                                                                           
 104 See Jason M. Shepard & Genelle Belmas, Anonymity, Disclosure and First Amendment Bal-
ancing in the Internet Era: Developments in Libel, Copyright, and Election Speech, 15 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 92, 94 (2012) (stating that the unique characteristics of the Internet and online speech have 
induced a slew of lawsuits over anonymous speech rights online); Allison Stiles, Everyone’s a Critic: 
Defamation and Anonymity on the Internet, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, 4 (stating that over the 
past few years online libel suits focusing on anonymous posting have been increasingly prevalent 
across the United States). 
 105 See McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that Ohio’s statute 
forbidding the dissemination of anonymous campaign literature is a violation of the First Amend-
ment). 
 106 See Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 
117, 136–37 (1996) (explaining how the Internet “amplifies” speech because it gives an online poster 
a very cheap platform to reach the masses, as compared with traditional paper announcements). 
 107 See id. at 137 (stating that the decision in McIntyre should extend to speech on the Internet). 
 108 See Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for Unmasking 
Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 841–42 (2010) (explaining that lawsuits against 
anonymous online posters cover various types of speech). The author explains that the subject matter 
can cover any topic imaginable, may involve issues of public importance or private matters, and the 
speech may contain elements that are arguably fact or opinion. Id.; see Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber 
Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 69–71 (2009) (describing various types of cyber assaults that people 
engage in, such as death threats, rape threats, statements that damage individuals’ reputations, and 
statements that affect individuals’ employment prospects); Shepard & Belmas, supra note 104, at 96 
(explaining that the computer screen not only shields people from being accountable for their speech 
on the Internet but it can also undermine government authority and security and undermine business 
interests). 
 109 See P.H., Anonymous Social Networking, Secrets and Lies, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 22, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/03/anonymous-social-networking [https://perma.
cc/8LHK-MGT3] (explaining that the expansion of technology and social media enables children to 
bully their victims from afar instead of in person). 
 110 See Scileppi, supra note 46, at 335 (explaining that the Supreme Court has already given wide 
First Amendment protections to speech on the Internet). This extension would naturally only go so far 
as to protect speech that is not considered defamation, obscenity, fighting words, or other regularly 
prohibited forms of speech. Laura Rogal, Anonymity in Social Media, 7 PHX. L. REV. 61, 67 (2013). 
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speech on the Internet and he or she is subsequently sued, he or she should be 
allowed to proceed anonymously.111 
When a plaintiff brings a lawsuit against an online poster, it is natural for 
them to want to expose the identity of the individual who has injured them so 
that the defendant may, in turn, be subject to ridicule or otherwise suffer the 
consequences of having their conduct exposed to the public.112 The online 
poster would probably prefer to remain anonymous in any judicial proceeding 
so that their name is not publicly associated with their alleged conduct.113 If 
the court denies the online poster’s motion to proceed anonymously and re-
quires use of their given name, interlocutory review of a denial of a motion to 
proceed anonymously is appropriate under the collateral order doctrine.114 As a 
result of the holding in Village of Deerfield, the court of appeals would have 
the requisite jurisdiction to hear this appeal before a judgment on the merits 
was entered.115 If the court decides to hear the appeal, it will have to use the 
same balancing test applied in Village of Deerfield and weigh the poster’s First 
Amendment interest, if any, against the public’s interest in an open judicial 
system and the adversary’s interest in knowing the identity of the defendant.116 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Tien, supra note 106, at 121 (proclaiming that anonymous speech on the Internet is de-
serving of First Amendment protections). 
 112 See Samuel J. Morley, Unmasking Anonymous Internet Posters: Can Civil Procedure Rules 
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 114 See Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d at 376 (announcing that a denial of a motion to proceed 
anonymously meets the strict requirements of the collateral order doctrine and is therefore immediate-
ly appealable). The order definitively prevents the party from proceeding anonymously. Id. Whether a 
party to a case uses their real name or a pseudonym has no effect on the underlying merits being liti-
gated. Id. If a party was required to litigate a case until a final judgment was entered using their real 
name, review of the motion at that stage would be pointless. Id. 
 115 See id. (announcing that, as a class, denials of motions to proceed anonymously are immedi-
ately appealable). 
 116 See id. at 377 (stating that the district court correctly balanced Doe’s reasons for requesting 
anonymity against the defendants’ and public’s rights to know the identity of parties to a case and any 
potential prejudice that may affect the other party in making a determination on the motion); Rosen-
berger, supra note 5, at 592 (citing Doe v. Stegall to explain the lack of “hard and fast formula” of a 
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CONCLUSION 
In 2016, in Doe v. Village of Deerfield, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit correctly decided, in accord with other Circuits, that, as a 
class, appeals from a denial of a motion to proceed anonymously are immedi-
ately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The decision does not im-
peril the value of the final judgment rule, as the requirements of collateral or-
der review remain demanding and it is unlikely that many other orders will be 
able to meet the requirements, if attempted in the future. The ruling is likely to 
have important implications when a case involving speech and anonymity on 
the Internet arises. The courts will then have to make a decision that could 
have far reaching consequences for First Amendment protections. 
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